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Introduction and Scope 
“I think Frankenstein ought to be required reading for all scientists.” 
Dr. Charles Forbin in Colossus: The Forbin project1 
 
The phrase “information society” (or “information age”, or “information 
revolution”; I will discuss this below) is becoming more and more commonplace. Yet, for 
all their rigorous research and discourse, information scientists and theorists may not be 
able to answer a key question in this field: What would everyday life be like in an 
information society? In this paper, I posit that the best way to address this question is by 
broadening the academic conversation to include works of science fiction (SF), the 
creators of which have been considering this and related questions for centuries. This is 
not a matter of simply deferring to SF’s predictions about the future, which would be a 
mistake: when SF does attempt to prophesy, it loses its real literary power to the lure of 
shallow techno-fetishism. Writer Michael Chabon (2008) has commented that  
[a]ccurate prediction of the future, of its technologies and traumas, has always 
seemed to me to be the least interesting thing about science fiction. So Arthur C. 
Clarke predicted the global satellite network – so what? He also predicted the 
widespread use of hovercrafts and the dominance by 2001 of the commercial 
Earth-Moon space trade by Pan-Am Airlines (d.1991). Such prescience or the 
obligation to display it is, more than bad writing, the element of a work of sf that 
most readily dooms it – regardless of whether the predictions turn out to be right 
or wrong. Every future we imagine is transformed inexorably into a part of our 
children’s understanding of their past, of the assumptions their parents and 
grandparents could not help but make. (p. 103)  
The same problems exist for the imagined futures of information society studies as do for 
SF, but even worse than inaccurate predictions is that, 
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 [d]espite the vast volumes of paper that have been devoted to celebrating or (less 
often) cautioning about this emergent socioeconomic structure, there is something 
of a dearth of statistical analysis of the issues raised... There seems to be more 
interest in visionary exhortations about the [Information Age] than in close 
inspection of what trends and potentials are revealed by available data. (Ian Miles 
cited in Duff, 2000, p. 124) 
So, SF and information society studies seem to have complementary strengths. SF 
is most effective when it focuses on humanity in a technological context and isn’t 
disproportionately concerned with the details of the futuristic worlds that provide that 
context. Information science is most effective when it relies (as academic writing should) 
on statistics and critical analysis rather than jumping to fantastic conclusions. Information 
scientists and theorists should leave the “visionary exhortation” to the creators of SF, 
which would free information society studies of the tendency to create its own science 
fiction and encourage more devotion to rigorous academic research. In this paper, I will 
demonstrate that SF has a long and healthy history of addressing such issues as fall 
within the information society studies umbrella, with the hopes of initiating a move 
toward including SF works in the classrooms, readers, and bibliographies of information 
science. 
It would be impossible to cover the entire world of science fiction for a paper 
such as this. I beg the reader to keep this in mind while reading what inevitably is an 
incomplete examination of the genre. Additionally, the careful reader will note that works 
originally published in English dominate the bibliography. This is a result of the limited 
set of works available to the author, an English-speaking American student. Non-English 
SF traditions are strong and should be considered in any further research. What SF is 
considered in this paper may originate from any country or era, and the body of texts 
includes novels, short stories, feature-length motion pictures, and television programs. 
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Although I did not address other media or formats, they should certainly be considered in 
future research; notable examples include the music of David Bowie (e.g. “Oh! You 
Pretty Things” [1971]) and Gary Numan (e.g. “Are Friends Electric?” [1979]), graphic 
novels like Paul Pope’s (2002-2004/2005) 100% and Masamune Shirow’s (1989/2004) 
Ghost in the Shell, video/computer games such as Flashback and Bioshock, and Karel 
Capek’s play R.U.R. (1921/2004), which contains the first use of the word robot 
(“Robot”, n.d.), among many others.  
Two authors that I am particularly indebted to for my perspectives on science 
fiction and the information society are Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., whose The Seven 
Beauties of Science Fiction (2008) was indispensible in understanding the cultural 
significance of SF, and Frank Webster, who, as editor of The Information Society Reader 
(2004), shaped my understanding of the information society conversation without my 
actually having read any of his oft-cited research. While I would happily recommend 
these works to any reader, further research into this topic would benefit from examining 
other writers’ points of view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Sargent & Bridges, 1970/2004. 
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Introduction to Science Fiction 
As with any literary genre, it is difficult to pin down a definition of SF with 
satisfactory specificity. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. does not claim to provide such a 
definition in The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (2008), but he does discuss several 
literary components (the “beauties”) that no work of SF is without. Individual works vary 
in their application, and those described as “borrowing elements from SF” might apply 
only one or two with no less effectiveness.  Csicsery-Ronay’s beauties are as follows. 
1. Fictive neology: “... new words and other signs that indicate worlds changed from 
their own... They engage audiences to use them as clues and triggers to construct 
the logic of science-fictional worlds” (p. 5). Fictive neology may take the form of 
fully new words or whole languages (e.g. The Day the Earth Stood Still’s “Klaatu 
barada nikto” [1951/2003] or Star Trek’s Klingon language [Meyer & Flinn, 
1991/2000]), adjustments to already extant words (e.g. Nineteen Eighty-Four’s 
[Orwell, 1949/1977] “thoughcrime” and “ungood”), or new definitions for 
familiar words (e.g. the cyberpunk “meat” [Gibson, 1984, p. 152], signifying the 
physical body). 
2. Fictive novums: “... a historically unprecedented ‘new thing’” that indicates 
“imaginary models of radical transformations of human history... Every SF text 
supplies fictive novums and responses to them, and thus engages the sense of real 
inhabitants of technorevolutionary societies that are bombarded with real-world 
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3. Future history: “... a sense of the integral connections between the past and the 
future” that “create[s] convincing images of life in the future” or an alternate past 
or present] (p. 6, 76). “Although SF need not always be set in the future, the genre 
is inherently future-oriented” (p. 6). For example, the subgenre known as 
steampunk is not necessarily set in our future, but rather a future (or even a past) 
in which steam powered technologies and aesthetics never lost their dominance in 
the world; the “information age” may even have arrived, but zeppelins still crowd 
the skies and gas lamps light up the night (pp. 108-110). 
4. Imaginary science: “playful deviations from known scientific thought” (p. 6). “SF 
is the main artistic means for introducing technoscientific ideas and events among 
the value-bearing stories and metaphors of social life” (p. 6). Imaginary science 
includes such “not-impossible” or “difficult to disprove” ideas such as faster-than-
light transportation, self-aware artificial intelligence, and fully-immersive virtual 
reality, as well as many scientific absurdities like audible explosions in the 
vacuum of space, shrink-rays, and alien life forms that apparently speak English 
upon first contact.  
5. Science-fictional sublime: usually “... a sense of awe and dread in response to 
human technological projects that exceed the power of their human creators” (p. 
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7). “Of all contemporary genres, SF is the one most expected to evoke the 
experience of the sublime” (p. 6). The science-fictional sublime is often 
experienced when the technological comes to resemble the natural or the cosmic, 
whether large (Star Wars’s moon-sized space station, the Death Star [Lucas, 
1977/2008]) or small (humanoid machines spontaneously developing the capacity 
for emotion, such as in Blade Runner [Scott, Fancher, & Peoples, 1982/2007]). 
6. Science-fictional grotesque: “... a sense of fascination and horror at the prospect 
of intimate category-violating phenomena discovered by human science” (p. 7). 
“This is the domain of monstrous beings, interstitial beings, and anomalous 
physical phenomena” (p. 7). The science fictional grotesque reveals the fact that 
humans are not “at the top of the food chain”, either literally (as in the film Alien 
[Scott & O’Bannon, 1979/2004] and sequels) or figuratively (as in H.P. 
Lovecraft’s [1928/1999] “The Call of Cthulu” and related stories, wherein it is 
revealed that humanity will be destroyed not because it is the object of some evil 
activity, but because the “the earth and all its inhabitants are but a momentary 
incident in the unending cyclical chaos of the universe” [Joshi, 1999, p. xvii]).  
7. The Technologiade: traditional narrative forms and devices reoriented toward “the 
transformation of human societies as a result of innovations attending 
technoscientific projects ... [SF’s] miniature myth-making structures 
simultaneously dislocate the audience’s orientation toward its familiar reality, and 
link the fictive predicament – radically new in its objective conditions – to 
conventional story-structures that recontain the radical newness” (p. 7). The term 
refers to the literary form known as the Robinsonade (after Daniel Defoe’s 
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[1719/2003] Robinson Crusoe), which may be defined as the “modern colonial 
adventure tale” (p. 217). The Technologiade incorporates elements of the 
Robinsonade, along with those of Gothic and utopian literature, as SF’s history 
runs parallel with these literary forms. Significantly, it also breaks away from and 
reorganizes their structures to create its own literary structures and formulas. 
SF has a surprisingly long history of considering the technology and its 
applications. Mary Shelley’s (1818/2003) Frankestein: or, The Modern Prometheus is 
widely considered to be the first true work of science fiction precisely because it 
considers the creation, implementation, and implication of a specific (and still 
nonexistent) technology: human reanimation. Other cited ancestral works include Louis-
Sébastien Mercier’s (1771/1999) Year 2440 for being the first fictional work set in the 
distant future (Alkon, 1987, p. 5); Jonathan Swift’s (1726/2003) Gulliver’s Travels for 
critiquing the effects of science on society (Csiscery-Ronay, 2008, p.126); Thomas 
Moore’s (1516) Utopia for presenting a fictional foreign land (ibid, p. 35); and, going 
back even further, 1,001 Arabian Nights for including encounters with mechanical 
humanoids and beasts (Pinault, 1992), and so on. Although considering works of legend, 
myth, and tradition to be SF has its detractors (Aldiss, 1986, pp. 27-28), I believe the 
topic of this paper would be enhanced by a brief discussion of one SF-ancestral work: the 
story of the golem. The earliest golem story may be found in the Babylonian Talmud, in 
which an artificial man is created and destroyed, and this story apparently refers to 
discussion in an older text, the Sefer Yezirah or Book of Creation, which  
contains lengthy discussions on God’s creation of the universe achieved by 
combinations of the twenty-two letters in the Hebrew alphabet. Thus the Talmud 
and the Sefer Yezirah represent two complementary discussions: the fact of 
creating artificial life and the technique for doing so. (Bilski & Idel, 1988, p. 10) 
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A twelfth- or thirteenth-century text explains several techniques for creating a golem, all 
of which involve animating lifeless dust with the careful use of words and letters. One 
technique involves writing “the three Hebrew letters that spell emet (truth) ... on his 
forehead. When the first letter is erased, leaving the word met (he is dead), the golem is 
destroyed” (ibid, p. 11). Perhaps the best-known golem is that of Rabbi Loew, who is 
said to have created it in the 16th century to protect the Jews of Prague during persecution 
by those who believed that Christian blood was required for Passover rituals (ibid, p. 14). 
Isaac Bashevis Singer (1988) describes the unfortunate outcome of this well-intended 
creation:  
In the golem legends, the golem often became independent, rebellious, and a 
danger to his maker. The golem of Prague ... turned out to be an extreme literalist. 
When he was ordered to bring water from the well into Rabbi Loew’s house, he 
kept on carrying pails of water in until the house was flooded. It grew more and 
more difficult to “program” him. He became so unruly that Rabbi Loew had to 
erase the sacred name engraved on his forehead and thus put an end to his 
existence. (p. 8, emphasis mine) 
Although the golem story may be used as an allegory for many human pursuits gone 
awry, I believe that, because of its emphasis on the difficult relationship between the 
word of the fallible creator and the word’s interpretation by the too-faithful creation, it 
has special significance when considering the way that information technology, likewise 
the product of fallible creators, effects expressions of society.  
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Definition of the Information Society 
The information society is defined or described in many ways by information 
theorists. The least satisfying definition is the somewhat fatalist idea that the information 
society is simply what follows the industrial society, which in turn follows the agrarian 
society, as time marches on. This remarkably causality-free notion of inevitable progress 
is somewhat appealing and very reassuring because of its confidence, but “Every 
generation believes that it is at a seminal point on the time-line of technological progress. 
It is either the age of iron, the age of the train, the age of flight, or in our case the 
information age” (Haywood, 1997, quoted in Duff, 2000, p. 13). Christopher May (2002) 
points out that 
the relationship between technology, its ‘character’ and society is much more 
complex than a unidirectional determinism allows. Furthermore, many of the 
claims for revolution telescope the history of information technologies to identify 
profound changes on the basis of the most recent generations of ICTs 
[information and communication technologies]. Once we recognize that there has 
been a long gestation of the relevant technologies and of their interaction with 
societies across the globe, then the claims for revolution start to look a little 
strained. (p. 14)  
Additionally, there is the question of “whether we are indeed witnessing a new 
social formation, or a variant of an older, much more familiar, social formation” (Duff, 
2000, p. 98); it is largely assumed to be the former without much serious consideration of 
the latter, with few exceptions. At best, the historical definition fails to hold much water, 
and, at worst, it could be used by as justification for the exploitation of “developing” 
nations much like they have been exploited in the name of industrial progress. It is 
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because of the relatively un-illuminating nature of this definition that I have chosen to use 
the term “information society” rather than “information age” or “information revolution” 
in this paper, although these terms may be more useful in other contexts and discussions. 
Moving outside the frame of unidirectional determinism, the passage of time does 
raise an important question, namely: Are we there yet? As Alistair Duff (2000, pp. 4-6) 
and May (2002, pp. 3-5) have pointed out, the phrase “information society” dates from 
the 1960s, and discussions of the ideas associated with it, but absent the phrase itself, 
may date back even further. Duff (2000) also cites a range of sources from a range of 
dates that claim “we” (presumably the United States, Japan, or possibly all “developed” 
nations) have been living in an information society since the 1980s, some that say it’s just 
around the corner (again, for some or for all), and some that speak of it as a still-distant 
possibility rather than an impending inevitability (pp. 2-13). That there is disagreement 
here may mean that we simply are not there yet, but it could also mean that simply do not 
have effective agreement on what it is we are trying to discuss – it is, after all, difficult to 
predict a change without knowing what that change will be. Thankfully some scholars, 
including May, refrain from prediction at all, and choose to acknowledge trends without 
claiming to know their outcome and meaning. At first glance, definitional ambiguity 
seems to confound an examination of illustrations and discussions of these ideas in works 
of science fiction narrative. On the contrary, I believe it lends weight to my premise that 
science fiction narrative has the ability to make its audience consider the possible full 
implications of speculations about the information society in a way that would enrich 
scholarly information science literature.   
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In Information society studies, Duff (2000) examines the major “information 
society theses” found in information science literature and elsewhere.  The first, which 
Duff calls the “information sector thesis”, examines the notion that an information 
society is one in which the economy has moved from an emphasis on industry and 
manufacturing to service and information as a commodity (19).  
The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States [by Fritz 
Machlup, 1962] is believed to contain the original proof of the startling 
proposition that an advanced industrial society, namely the USA, was on the way 
to developing a new type of economy, the ‘information economy’. This 
proposition involved two interrelated empirical claims: first, that a significant and 
inexorably growing section of the gross national product of the USA can be 
attributed to information activities; and second, that the numerically dominant 
sector of the US workforce is now engaged in information-centred occupations. 
(p. 21)  
Duff believes that Machlup’s work was seriously flawed and, worse, that these 
flaws have been recognized by almost no one. The result is that the corpus of the 
information sector thesis, which “is almost entirely derived from [this] single source” (p. 
19), is also seriously flawed. Nevertheless, this version of the information society thesis 
“has been so dominant that it is hardly surprising that commentators have been misled 
into assuming that it is the only version in existence” (p. 19). If, as Duff suggests, we 
should view this thesis with a great deal of skepticism at best, we must still acknowledge 
its influence. Additionally, one wonders if the information sector thesis is something of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, as media commentators and government officials alike seem to 
revel in the idea of an information economy, celebrating the arrival and growth of 
information technology businesses to their constituent areas. Whether this move toward 
an information economy affects change toward a whole information society, however, 
remains to be seen.  
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Duff also discusses an “information flows thesis”, which hails largely from Japan 
and attempts “to measure the amount of information cascading across the communication 
channels of society” (p. 71).  Significantly, this research, which began in the late 1960s, 
examines “all information flows – without privileging science or any other particular 
kind of information or knowledge” (p. 72), and, I would add, without concern for 
economic value. This thesis suggests “that ‘any society is largely involved in information 
activities’, and that, therefore, ‘information societies have existed since man established 
the first community’” (Duff, p. 95, quoting Tetsuro Tomita). What is significant about 
today (and what is analogous in importance with the information society as 
conceptualized by Western theory) is that Japan (and probably other nations) is becoming 
Bunshu Shakai: “the segmented information society” (p. 85), an emergent social 
formation in which  
[t]he demand for information provided by mass media, which are one-way 
communications, has become stagnant, and the demand for information provided 
by personal telecommunication media, which are characterized by two-way 
communication, has drastically increased. This means that our [Japan’s] society is 
moving toward a new stage ... in which more priority is placed on segmented, 
more detailed information to meet individual needs instead of conventional mass-
reproduced conformed information. (The Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunication in Duff, p. 85)  
In this thesis, then, changing methods and reasons for communicating information are the 
reason for massive societal change. Duff is critical of this thesis’s relative lack of 
academic rigor (specifically that these studies have not been done in a peer-reviewed 
setting), but praises its methodology and insight nonetheless. It is also worth noting that 
the West has largely ignored the scholarship and theory resulting from Bunshu Shakai 
studies. Incorporating this work, in Duff’s opinion and my own, would enrich and deepen 
Western information society theory.   
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Duff summarizes the third thesis, the “information technology thesis”, as 
“[contending] that the information society is a society which has gone through a so-called 
‘information revolution’ or ‘information technology revolution’” (p. 101); technology 
itself (along with our creation and use of it), rather than economics or communication, is 
the central force behind the transition. Duff cites Ian Miles as the most important 
proponent of this thesis, and Miles, in turn, refers to three sub-schools of thought that all 
take different positions on the relationship between technological development and social 
change.  
The first is continuism, which emphasises the overlaps between different phases 
of industrialisation – including the phase signified by terms like ‘informatisation’ 
and ‘information society’... [Continuists are] social determinists, maintaining that 
technology does not have any in-built propensities for the shaping of society, and 
certainly not for shaping it in a socially progressive fashion. At the opposite pole 
is transformism, according to which IT [information technology] is radically 
changing the nature of society and its institutions; it is doing this with a high 
degree of inevitability, and is doing it largely in a way which satisfies many of the 
standard criteria for social progress... Advanced nations are purportedly in the 
early stages of a technological revolution which is bringing about a social 
formation – even an epoch, a civilisation – as different from industrial forms of 
life as the latter differed from agrarianism. (pp. 111-112, emphasis mine)  
Miles’s third sub-school is his own synthesis, which he calls structuralism, a reference to 
the literary and cultural analytical method of the same name. For structuralists, “the 
information revolution is conceptualised as taking place within the framework of the 
industrial revolution, as a kind of mini-revolution, and the information society as being a 
species or phase of advanced industrialism” (p. 113). Additionally, 
... structuralism maintains, with transformism, that ‘IT represents a revolutionary 
technology’, and that talk of a new ‘IT paradigm’ is valid (Miles et al. 1988: 7, 
247-8). It also agrees that society is going to be significantly changed by the 
information revolution, and that the term ‘information society’ will be an accurate 
descriptor for the resulting formation. It readily acknowledges that, on even the 
most conservative scenario, we face ‘a vision of the future which implies 
immense social change’. (p. 113) 
16 
Duff, acknowledging that Miles’s research has similar problems as the Bunshu 
Shakai theorists,  suggests that the structuralist approach “is best seen as a serious 
negotiation with the proposition that a new socio-technical system has resulted from a set 
of social, economic and technological factors, including, centrally, the growth of 
informatics” (p. 129, emphasis in original). Because “advocates ... regard technology 
(whether telecommunications, computers, or new media, notably the internet, or indeed 
all new technologies) as both the major expression of and the primary force bringing into 
being the new Information Society” (Webster, 2004, p. 10), the structuralist approach 
holds a great deal of promise in quantitatively studying the effects of technology on 
society. 
Each of these definitions of the information society embodies a conception of how 
our world will change as time passes. They are all flawed to varying degrees, but they 
nevertheless accurately capture some of the ways people think of themselves as part of a 
society. This consideration will guide the rest of the paper, where I will examine 
individuals in society along the axes of government, economics, and culture.  
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What are people like as citizens of an information society’s government? 
Without ever explicitly claiming a particular political ideology, information 
theorists have strong opinions about the role of government in an information society. In 
The Information Society: A Sceptical View, Christopher May (2002) summarizes the 
conversation effectively, describing a general belief that  
not only are new social groups appearing but they will mobilize widely 
dispersed individuals into effective (niche) interest groups who will have an 
increasing impact on the political process. In this sense, the ‘new social 
movements’ are emblematic of political community in the information age. 
Mobilizing on the basis of arguments for the transformation of political personal 
lives, as well as political interest, a new networked politics is emerging... 
An underlying distrust of government in the discussion of information 
society often takes the form of an explicit argument that it will allow civil society 
to successfully confront the state, which is outdated and no longer (if it ever was) 
the most efficient way to organize society... [T]he power of the state to intervene 
has ... been fatally compromised by ICTs. (pp. 15-16) 
Yoneji Masuda’s (1990/2004) vision exemplifies this trend and is particularly well-
elaborated: 
Industrial society is a society of centralized power and hierarchical 
classes. The information society, however, will be a multi-centered and 
complementary voluntary society. It will be horizontally functional, maintaining 
social order by autonomous and complementary functions of a voluntary civil 
society... 
 The political system of industrial society is a parliamentary system and 
majority rule. In the information society the political system will become a 
participatory democracy. It will be the politics of participation by citizens; the 
politics of autonomous management by citizens, based on agreement, 
participation and synergy that take in the opinions of minorities. (p. 17, emphases 
in original) 
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Masuda does not foresee the outright death of government, but the line of reasoning is 
similar: mass-computerization means stronger citizen groups, and stronger citizen groups, 
in many evaluations, means weaker government.  
A similar point of view can be found in Howard Rheingold’s (2002) Smart Mobs. 
Rheingold espouses the “power of the mobile many”, citing situations in Manila, Seattle, 
Vancouver, San Francisco, Britain, Senegal, Mexico, and Chechnya in which organizers 
used mobile and network technology to organize political demonstrations, nonviolent and 
nonviolent alike (pp. 157-164). He also describes the notable trend of “p2p” (peer-to-
peer) journalism, in which mobile users forward personally acquired information to each 
other without any mediating journalistic institutions (pp. 164-169). Of course, these 
means may be used to “unserious” (entertainment) ends just as easily as or easier than 
“serious” (political) ones, and it is as yet unclear how effectively these trends might be 
co-opted by government or corporate interests. Recent developments in Iran – citizen-
journalist information and government-generated disinformation informing the outside 
world through Twitter (“Iran uses tech tools”, 2009) – and China – the government 
blocked mobile phone and Twitter service during clashes between ethnic Uighurs and 
ethnic Han Chinese in the Xinjiang region (Kuhn & Block, 2009) – certainly add 
complexity to the discussion. In any case, Rheingold’s point is that there can be no 
denying the significance of technologically-enabled social trends that circumvent official 
or familiar channels for whatever reason; they may provide early examples of Masuda’s 
“stronger citizen groups” and “weaker government”, or they may provide 
counterexamples (by way of tech-savvy governments) that are no less significant. 
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Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler (1996/2004) 
also predict a dramatic decline in the influence of the government: “Second Wave 
[industrial society] policies centralize power in bureaucratic institutions; Third Wave 
[information society] policies work to spread power – to empower those closest to the 
decision” (p. 41), though they also state that “smaller government does not imply weak 
government; nor does arguing for smaller government require being ‘against’ government 
for narrowly ideological reasons” (p. 38).   Their evaluation also emphasizes an increase 
in power for the private sector: “[government] should focus on removing barriers to 
competition and massively deregulating the fast-growing telecommunications and 
computing industries” (p. 37).  May’s (2002) own opinion is appropriately skeptical:  
I argue ... that although the decline of the state is a death frequently foretold, the 
end is hardly imminent. Not only have some states been very successful at 
organizing their economies to respond to the information revolution, the 
supposition that such a revolution can transpire without a central role for the state 
is mistaken... [O]nly by obscuring the role of law and authority in society can 
proclamations of the information age suppose the state must necessarily be in 
decline. (pp. 16-17)  
Because its scope tends to be society-wide (or wider), most science fiction 
addresses government, if sometimes only peripherally. The utopian/dystopian subgenre, 
exemplified by George Orwell’s (Orwell, 1949/1977) novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
addresses governmental issues of particular interest to information society studies, and 
these works in particular depict powerful, centralized governments that derive power over 
their citizenry through the control and manipulation of information. Nineteen Eighty-
Four depicts a system of government called “Ingsoc”, short for “English Socialism”, 
though it is in fact a totalitarian system that “rejects and vilifies every principle for which 
the Socialist movement originally stood, and ... does so in the name of Socialism” (p. 
216). This contradiction between stated names and meanings extends into IngSoc’s four 
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governmental ministries, including Minitruth (which constructs and disperses 
misinformation and disinformation) and Miniluv (which is a center of brainwashing and 
surveillance, as well as the home to the Thought Police) (pp. 3-4). Through a tight control 
on its citizens’ information intake (distributing shallow entertainment to the proletariat 
masses, constantly editing the historical record for the appearance of consistency, and so 
on) Ingsoc is able to remain in power indefinitely. Nineteen Eighty-Four contains perhaps 
the classic illustration of a totalitarianism that derives its power from information more 
than any other resource, and, as such, deserves special consideration within information 
society studies. 
Aldous Huxley’s (1932/1969) Brave New World depicts a government that is 
similar to that in Nineteen Eighty-Four, with differences that are notable for this 
discussion. Brave New World also describes totalitarianism (“The World State”), but one 
whose power derives from an intellectually pacified citizenry rather than one that is 
paralyzed with paranoia. What Ingsoc does to the proletariat class alone, The World State 
does to everyone by means of shallow entertainment (television, sexually-themed 
“feelies” similar to the “talkies” of Huxley’s day, games like “Centrifugal Bumble-
puppy”, holidays, constant sexual stimulation in pairs or groups, and the all-purpose drug 
soma). Neil Postman (1985/2005) describes the difference between Nineteen Eighty-Four 
and Brave New World this way: 
What Orwell feared were those who would ban books. What Huxley feared was 
that there would be no reason to ban a book, for there would be no one who 
wanted to read one... Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed from us. 
Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. Orwell feared 
we would become a captive culture. Huxley feared we would become a trivial 
culture, preoccupied with some equivalent of the feelies, the orgy porgy, and the 
centrifugal bumblepuppy (sic). As Huxley remarked in Brave New World 
Revisited, the civil libertarians and rationalists who are ever on the alert to oppose 
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tyranny "failed to take into account man's almost infinite appetite for 
distractions." (pp. xix-xx)  
Brave New World, then, demonstrates the idea of an information overload society and a 
possible counterargument to the idea that a given technology inevitably engenders 
democracy and citizen participation. 
Brazil (Gilliam, Stoppard, & McKeown, 1985/2004) also presents a variation on 
the Nineteen Eighty-Four vision of government. Here, the information-conscious spirit of 
the government is very similar, with the Ministry of Information’s Deputy Minister 
proclaiming that “in a free society, information’s the name of the game. You can’t win 
the game if you’re a man short.” Slogans abound: “Information: the way to prosperity”; 
“Be safe: be suspicious”; “Don’t suspect a friend, report him”. What Brazil adds is a tone 
of absurdity that allows the audience to laugh a bit at the means before recoiling in horror 
at the end. Ridiculous amounts of paperwork with impenetrable numerical codes may 
pave the road, but the destination is still monstrous torture at the hands of bureaucrats in 
the “information retrieval” department. Brazil demonstrates that government institutions 
need not operate with any kind of efficiency or competence to impose information-based 
totalitarianism. 
SF visions also exist that present some decentralist governments, though perhaps 
not those desired by Masuda and Dyson et al; one such optimistic point of view is found 
in the Star Trek franchise. In Star Trek history, the nations of earth are at war with one 
another until Zefram Cochrane completes the first faster-than-light (“warp”) spaceflight 
in 2063. Nearby aliens, the Vulcans, detect the flight and make first contact with humans 
(Okuda & Okuda, 1999, pp. 80-81). A combination of further technological advance and 
the incorporation of Vulcan and other alien life forms into earth society lead to change so 
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massive that Captain Jonathan Archer declares, less than 100 years later, that “[o]n Earth, 
between humans, war has been eliminated” (Coto & Straiton, 2004/2006). The resulting 
worldwide government is part of the United Federation of Planets, an “interstellar 
alliance of planetary governments and colonies, united for mutual trade, exploratory, 
scientific, cultural, diplomatic, and defensive endeavors” (Okuda & Okuda, 1999, p. 538) 
modeled loosely after our own United Nations. 24th-century Captain Jean-Luc Picard 
informs a person from the 21st century that “[t]he acquisition of wealth is no longer the 
driving force in our lives. We wish to better ourselves and the rest of humanity” (Braga, 
Moore, & Frakes, 1996/2005), indicating that it is market-dominated economics, and not 
government, that has withered away. Star Trek suggests a utopian scenario in which the 
world is united by a desire for discovery and exploration, and that these information-
gathering activities are essential to Earth’s united government. 
The inverse of Star Trek’s “withering of the market” scenario can be found in 
works like William Gibson’s (1984) Neuromancer and Neal Stephenson’s (1992) Snow 
Crash. These works, both of which fall into the cyberpunk subgenre and emphasize the 
economic and political significance of information, depict heightening corporate power 
and declining government power along with irrelevant or fractal political boundaries. In 
Neuromancer, national militaries are still operational, but the private standing armies of 
megacorporations are able to compete quite easily. The only nonmilitary government 
activity described in the book is that of the Turing Registry, which monitors artificial 
intelligences for unusual activity; governments apparently have no interest or ability in 
confronting the murder, drug-dealing, hacking, and organized crime that thrives on the 
street. In Snow Crash, the United States is actually only sovereign over what we would 
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today consider government property. North America has been broken into thousands of 
“burbclaves”, privately-owned, miniature nation-states distributed across the land. 
Corporate brand and sovereign nationality have become largely indistinguishable because 
of the increased power of the former and the decreased power of the latter. Government 
work is depicted as excessively bureaucratic and largely unconcerned with daily criminal 
behavior. Gibson has stated that “the cyberpunk future ... is a future in which 
globalization really does work both ways, and everybody—unless they’re very, very, 
very rich—winds up getting to be part of the Third World” (Long, 2007). In other words, 
the state has declined and business has been free to prosper, but the world is quite clearly 
not a better place for it. 
Global technocracy, government by “technician” or scientist, is another common 
governmental form in SF. In the Arkady and Boris Strugastky’s (1962/1978) Noon: 22nd 
Century, a form of Communism has found worldwide acceptance, with the curious 
development that there are no longer any manual laborers: all physical work, save some 
on newly colonized planets, is performed by machine, leaving only intellectual work for 
humans. The world is governed by the World Council, a representative body “sixty per 
cent composed of teachers and doctors” (p. 51), and apparently few lifelong politicians; 
also curious, Communism seems to have successfully decentralized (but not “withered”) 
in forming the World Council. The Council is not without internal controversy, but the 
World Council’s authority and wisdom is generally accepted by its constituents, who live 
in general contentment, thanks in large, it seems, to constant on-the-job intellectual 
stimulation. Although one might jump to the conclusion that the World Council is 
actually a totalitarian institution, this would be a fallacy; at worst it expresses a naive 
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understanding of the lure of power among those with knowledge and wisdom beyond that 
which exists in reality. In fact, all of the governments described here are all somewhat 
oversimplified precisely because they are fictional. SF representations of government 
succeed and are useful to information society studies because they are an extension of the 
central “What if?” question that guides SF’s contemplative nature.  
Other political considerations exist in information society studies, including the 
question of increasing surveillance as enabled by advances in information technology. 
David Lyon (2001/2004) has written extensively about what he calls “the sociology of 
surveillance” with an eye toward its modern and postmodern forms, especially those that 
rely on advanced information and communication technology (p. 328). He lists four 
strands of surveillance theory, beginning with a nation-state orientation, which “focuses 
on political imperatives that require surveillance, within geopolitical and military 
struggles” (p. 329). Lyon cites Christopher Dandeker’s observation of parallel, increased 
bureaucratization in the military (the external expression of nation-statehood) and internal 
policing and pacification (the internal expression of nation-statehood) (p. 329-330).  
Lyon himself cites George Orwell’s (1949/1977) Nineteen Eighty-Four as having 
“provided the most lasting and vivid metaphors for state surveillance” (Lyon, 2001/2004, 
p. 330). All citizens are monitored centrally by two-way television screens installed 
throughout their homes and elsewhere, and it is assumed or feared that nothing escapes 
their view. Besides this technologically-enabled method of surveillance, the state 
cultivates a whole culture of suspicion centered upon a godlike figure known as Big 
Brother (who, the posters proclaim, “is watching you” [p. 2]). Ingsoc Party members 
experience a kind of simultaneous fear and love of Big Brother because they are taught to 
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believe in Ingsoc policies whole heartedly, and because his power extends to an accused 
person’s torture and probable obliteration from the public record. The cult of Big Brother 
is so strong that the main character, Winston Smith, is afraid of doing or saying anything 
that could even be perceived as subversive (p. 3). Nineteen Eighty-Four illustrates the 
dangers of an asymmetrical information society, where those in power remain in power 
because they control the flow of information. 
In the film Minority Report (Spielberg, Frank, & Cohen, 2006/2002), “Precrime” 
is the name given to the division of the Washington, D.C. police department where 
special surveillance technology enables the precognition and prevention of murder. What 
makes Precrime possible is a trio of young people who, because their mothers abused a 
fictional drug, neuroin; the resulting neurological condition burdens these youths, called 
“Precogs” with the ability to see certain details about murders that have yet to take place, 
including both premeditated and unpremeditated murders. The Precogs are heavily 
sedated and connected to a computer system that records their visions and speech; the 
resulting data becomes evidence in a quick and largely rote teleconference trial, which 
establishes Detective John Anderton’s (Tom Cruise) legal right to arrest (and convict!) 
the perpetrator before the murder has even been committed. Additionally, police are 
apparently able to tap into commercial surveillance (discussed below) to track suspects, 
like ordinary closed-circuit security cameras but with more flexibility. Although the 
conflict of the film as expressed in its dialogue is more to do with free will and destiny, 
this moral question is framed in the context of a society with near-ubiquitous 
surveillance. Remarkably, no one in the film questions the right of Precrime to peek in on 
their lives, perhaps because they are more concerned with pleading innocence of a crime 
26 
they have not (yet?) committed. Minority Report presents a scenario of invasive 
surveillance used by the state to dubious ends, even if torture and execution never enter 
the scene.  
Lyon’s second strand of surveillance theory is a variation on the first, but with 
even more emphasis on bureaucratic intrusion into everyday life. The reigning body 
derives power over its subjects by instilling an ever-present sensation of uncertainty and 
resulting terror, illustrated best, as Lyon points out, by Franz Kafka’s (1925/1999) The 
Trial. Like the novel’s main character, Josef K., subjects of this system must constantly 
ask themselves, “Who wants this information, what do they already know, is it correct, 
and what will be done with what I divulge?” (p. 330). Lyon also cites Max Weber, for 
whom “bureaucratic surveillance is a means of procuring efficiency, especially in the 
large scale and unwieldy tasks that confront any expanding modern state” (p. 330). 
Brazil (Gilliam, Stoppard, & McKeown, 1985/2004) offers perhaps the best SF 
exploration of bureaucratic surveillance. Again, slogans like “Be safe: be suspicious” and 
“Don’t suspect a friend, report him” signal an Orwellian scenario, but, whereas citizens in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four are watched over by the precise and all-knowing Big Brother, 
Brazil’s Ministry of Information makes mistakes. The film depicts a simple clerical error 
resulting in the arrest, torture, and death of Archibald Buttle (Robert De Niro), an 
ordinary man, when it is Archibald Tuttle, an alleged terrorist, whose arrest was actually 
ordered. To further illustrate the absurd tragedy of the situation, we learn that Tuttle’s 
criminal activity is his work as a freelance air conditioning repairman who bypasses 
bureaucratic officialdom as a form of public service. Through a series of misinterpreted 
events, the Ministry of Information arrests and tortures main character Sam Lowry 
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(Jonathan Pryce), a recent transfer to the Ministry’s Information Retrieval department, 
because he is believed to be in on Tuttle’s terrorist plot. During the torture, he lapses into 
a daydream that includes Tuttle literally disappearing in a flurry of government 
paperwork. Brazil effectively relays the notion that a nation’s citizens may have as much 
reason to fear the information-seeking habits of an ineffective government as those of one 
that makes that trains run on time. 
A variation on this sort of bureaucratic surveillance can be seen in Gattaca 
(Niccol, 1997/2008). In this case, the organization in power is not, as in Brazil and The 
Trial, a bumbling-but-massive governmental agency that barely knows what information 
it has and what to do with it; instead, a cold, efficient aerospace corporation (like, the 
audience is told, all other businesses) monitors its employees with daily biometric exams 
and screens its applicants based on genetic makeup. “Of course,” the main character 
Vincent Freeman (Ethan Hawke) tells us, “it’s illegal to discriminate. Genoism, it’s 
called. But no one takes the law seriously.” The result is a de facto system of 
participatory surveillance that flourishes because everyone knows it happens and 
everyone holds information that is key to the system’s survival. Citizens do not fear being 
punished for the wrong crime as they do in Brazil because there is no wrong answer. In 
Gattaca, a person simply is or is not valid, and, without going to the extreme measures 
that Vincent undertakes, there is nothing he or she can do about it. 
  The third strand of surveillance is one of a “technological logic (or ‘technologic’ 
for short)” (p. 329). Lyon draws primarily on the work of Jacques Ellul, whose idea of la 
technique “integrates the machine into society ... constructs the social world that the 
machine needs ... seeks relentlessly for the one best way to operate, and in doing so 
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steadily seems to erode human agency” (p. 331). It is through this process that the 
computer becomes central to modern surveillance and that, possibly, surveillance 
becomes indivisible from computing: “once in place a surveillance technique such as a 
digitized identification number will tend to expand to cover other purposes” (p. 331).   
In the film Colossus: The Forbin Project (Sargent & Bridges, 1970/2004), a 
supercomputer (Colossus) intended by the US government to control all military activity 
unexpectedly achieves self-awareness. Among its first actions as an autonomous, sentient 
entity is the commandeering of the world’s computer networks and surveillance at all 
available military installations. Where surveillance does not exist, Colossus demands its 
installation by threat of global nuclear holocaust. In this way, a computer literally 
embodies Ellul’s notion of a social world constructed to the specification of a machine.  
A subtler example can be found in the manhunt scenes of Minority Report 
(Spielberg, Frank, & Cohen, 2006/2002). Precrime officers make use of machines called 
“spyders”, which are small, agile surveillance devices that allow quick, accurate searches 
of large or heavily populated areas.  
Spielberg transforms this sequence into a witty homage to Alfred Hitchcock’s 
1955 movie Rear Window... [T]he camera floats upward until it occupies a birds-
eye, cross-sectional view of the entire apartment complex. The building’s 
inhabitants stop their actions just long enough to allow the spyders to scan their 
eyes. The audience sees a man sitting on his toilet, a couple making love, and ... a 
woman who beats her husband (or boyfriend) during a domestic squabble pause 
just long enough for a retinal scan before she resumes hitting her partner. (Vest, 
2007, pp. 138-139). 
These people have been conditioned, somehow (perhaps through the threat of physical 
injury – spyders can deliver small electrical shocks, and Precrime officers seem willing to 
dole out extensive amounts of pain through an array of nonlethal weapons – or criminal 
prosecution), to allow the machines to interrupt and do their work during even the most 
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intimate and passionate of human activities. The spyders are not literally in control the 
way Colossus is, but the people act as if they are. 
In M.T. Anderson’s (2002) Feed, where the Internet is actually installed in one’s 
brain (discussed more below), the main character, Titus, explains the dilemma of an opt-
in system that is ultimately controlled by dubious institutions: 
Of course, everyone is like, da da da, evil corporations, oh they’re so bad, 
we all say that, and we all know they control everything. I mean, it’s not great, 
because who knows what evil shit they’re up to. Everyone feels bad about that. 
But they’re the only way to get all this stuff, and it’s no good being pissy about it, 
because they’re still going to control everything whether you like it or not. Plus, 
they keep like everyone in the world employed, so it’s not like we could do 
without them. And it’s really great to know everything about everything whenever 
we want, to have it just like, in our brain, just sitting there. (p. 40) 
An individual’s feed is typically installed at birth, meaning that that individual has no 
control over the decision, which is made by the parents, illustrating the way that a 
technology can seem to take on a power of its own as the surrounding culture comes to 
embrace it. Resistance is rare and makes life difficult, exemplified by one character’s 
being denied a job on account of his lack of feed implant (pp. 226-227).  Feed 
demonstrates the difficulty of choosing to resist participatory surveillance when that 
surveillance is an integral part of the dominant culture. 
Lyon’s final strand of surveillance theory is that of “political economy”, wherein 
one class exerts its dominance over others through surveillance practices (p. 331). 
“Electronic technologies are harnessed to assign varying economic values to different 
groups, and thus to computerize the production of inequality” (p. 332). This idea refers to 
such practices as centralizing workers in a factory so that they may all be overseen by 
management simultaneously, whether physically (as in the case of workshop employees) 
or electronically (by means of computer networks or closed-circuit television security 
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cameras). Lyon cites Gandy’s assertion that “consumer surveillance [operates] on 
panoptic principles, whereby personal data is used to sort populations into consuming 
types. Electronic technologies are harnessed to assign varying economic values to 
different groups, and thus to computerize the production of inequality” (p. 332). 
Just such inequality is depicted in Minority Report (Spielberg, Frank, & Cohen, 
2006/2002), where surveillance constantly reestablishes the consumer/supplier 
relationship. As each individual is detected by ubiquitous retinal or iris-recognition 
scanners, automated marketing displays and recordings adopt content tailored to personal 
taste and shopping history. Because this class-reinforcing activity is masked by a layer of 
customer service, those who are surveilled pass by without apparent concern for the 
security of their personal information. In fact, the only person visibly unnerved by the 
situation is our thoroughly Anglo hero when, after illegal eye transplant surgery, the 
commercial surveillance networks address him by an obviously Japanese name. Unless 
the system identifies them incorrectly, people in this society are neutral-at-worst about 
their being subjugated by a dominant class. 
A similar scenario is at work in Feed (Anderson, 2002), in which most Americans 
have equipped their brains with implanted Internet access (the “feed”). Titus, describes 
the situation: 
But the [best] thing about the feed, the thing that made it really big, is that it 
knows everything you want and hope for, sometimes before you even know what 
those things are. It can tell you how to get them, and help you make buying 
decisions that are hard. Everything we think and feel is taken in by the 
corporations ... and they make a special profile, one that’s keyed just to you, and 
then they give it to their branch companies, or other companies buy them, and 
they can get to know what it is we need, so all you have to do is want something 
and there’s a chance that it will be yours.” (p. 40)   
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Titus is remarkably honest about the degree to which his hopes and dreams are tied up 
with his identity as a consumer. This worldview isn’t an uncommon one in our world, but 
the feed vastly increases the degrees of both subjugation and acceptance.  
The preceding ideas, again, are the four strands of modern surveillance theory. 
Lyon’s carefully points out that postmodern surveillance theory does not yet exist, and 
warns that it will require more than just adding the phrase “in cyberspace” to the end of 
all the above descriptions (p. 340). Key points include the creation of multiple online 
identities by individuals, whether deliberate, conscious, or neither; the use of these 
identities by governments, bureaucracies, and businesses to predict (and perhaps 
determine) the actions and interests of those individuals; the blurring of supervision and 
surveillance as a part of electronic management techniques; and, finally, the application 
of panoptic principles upon every minute aspect of everyday life (the “superpanopticon”) 
(pp. 332-341).  
Even if postmodern surveillance theory is a work in progress, A Scanner Darkly 
(Linklater, 2006) shows that SF is capable of addressing the issues involved. In the film, 
Bob Arctor (Keanu Reeves) is an undercover narcotics officer assigned to investigate and 
dissolve a network of drug dealers. In order to retain absolute anonymity, Arctor and his 
co-workers all use a “scramble suit”, a wearable device that displays a rapidly changing 
patchwork of images of hundreds or thousands of people and alters his voice, ensuring 
that viewers simply cannot guess his actual identity. In order to maintain his professional 
anonymity in the company of his dealer contacts (since he cannot use the scramble suit in 
this environment), he adopts the name Fred and establishes a second identity as a junkie, 
partaking in Substance D as much as the others. In the process of his investigation, which 
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involves extensive surveillance of the house that the group of dealers and junkie 
congregate, he (Fred) becomes part of his (Bob’s) own investigation. His sense of reality 
begins to break down, both as a result of using Substance D (a kind of paranoia-inducing 
hallucinogen) and as a result of being on both sides of the surveillance camera. When he 
is sent to a rehab clinic, we learn that he has been an unwitting player in a police 
operation to infiltrate the clinic itself. Within the rehab system, he is given yet another 
name, Bruce, and a job tending crops that we learn, although Bob/Fred/Bruce does not 
understand, that his new job is part of the Substance D manufacturing process. A Scanner 
Darkly effectively considers the personal and societal effects of an environment of 
heightened surveillance and bureaucratically exploited multiple personal identities.  
Another political concern when for information society studies is that of the 
“digital divide”. Pippa Norris (2000/2004) has broken this idea into three parts: global 
divide among countries and social stratification within countries (both of which I address 
below), and democratic divide. The idea of a democratic divide “concerns the potential 
impact of the digital world on the distribution of power and influence in political 
systems” (p. 279).  Norris observes that “cyber-optimists” emphasize the “possibilities of 
the Internet for the involvement of ordinary citizens in direct democracy” (p. 279). 
“Cyber-pessimists”, she says, “regard digital technology as a Pandora’s box unleashing 
new inequalities of power and wealth, reinforcing deeper divisions between the 
information rich and poor, the tuned-in and tuned-out, and activists and the disengaged” 
(p. 279). “Lastly, cyber-skeptics argue that both these visions are exaggerated, since so 
far the potential of the Internet has failed to have a dramatic impact on the practical 
reality of ‘politics as usual’, for good or ill” (p. 280). Norris’s observation predates the 
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2008 U.S. presidential campaign, which may have demonstrated a significant change in 
the use of digital tools by candidates and voters alike; it also predates the aforementioned 
political unrest in Iran and China as well as any critical evaluation of these situations. 
The Star Trek franchise seems to fall into the cyber-optimist camp. Since civil 
unrest on Earth apparently ended with the ascension of Warp technology and contact with 
alien species, and since profit is no longer the motive for work (Moore & Landau, 
1990/2007), we must assume that economic classes have been eliminated, leaving 
everyone on the same level for technological and democratic participation. Feed 
(Anderson, 2002), on the other hand, falls into the cyber-pessimist camp: feed links are 
the method for all communications, whether social, commercial, or political. Voting is 
the sole exception, since “only about seventy-three percent of Americans have feeds” (p. 
92), but it is doubtful that people without one get the same attention from marketers and 
news organizations.  Scott Westerfeld’s (2005) cyber-skeptical Uglies addresses the issue 
by giving all the city’s residents a network connection, although almost no one has any 
interest in political processes to begin with. In fact, because of intellect-dulling surgery 
performed to all 16-year-olds, the only ones to resist the city’s power structure are 15-
year-old runaways who are, thus, disconnected from the ubiquitous networks. Uglies 
portrays a world where universal access, usually a lauded development, is not desirable 
because it increases the power of an untrustworthy government over its unknowing 
citizens. 
Government is but one influential force over the lives of individuals, but it is one 
of major importance. Governments can control every detail of one’s daily life, or they can 
be made to institute empowering, liberating policies that reinforce the humanity of their 
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constituents, always affecting the very fabric of society. Information technology is not an 
apolitical or neutral development, and it demands enough respect to address the political 
implications of its application in a theoretical information society just as it should be 
addressed in our own, very real society. Information society studies would gain a great 
deal by examining the myriad ways that SF has treated political concerns. 
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What are people like as laborers in an information society’s economy? 
The economic structure of a society has many far-reaching expressions and 
implications, but for individuals, it typically comes down to performing tasks and 
securing personal health and well-being: work. Robert Reich (1992/2004) has described 
“three broad categories of work” that grew to dominate the American labor market in the 
late 20th century and will continue to dominate in the future, and which, according to 
Reich, are also growing in other (presumably, but perhaps not exclusively) “developed” 
nations.  These categories are “routine production services, in-person services, and 
symbolic-analytic services” (p. 205, emphasis in original).  In this model, routine 
production services include those jobs that have been traditionally thought of as “blue-
collar”, as well as their “low- and mid-level managers” (p. 205). Significantly, this also 
includes the “hordes of data processors [the human variety] stationed in ‘back offices’ at 
computer terminals linked to worldwide information banks... The ‘information 
revolution’ may have rendered some of us more productive, but it has also produced huge 
piles of raw data which must be processed in much the same monotonous way that 
assembly-line workers and, before them, textile workers processed piles of raw 
materials” (p. 206).  
Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Winston Smith, Brazil’s Sam Lowry, and THX-1138’s 
(Lucas & Murch, 1971/2004), THX (Robert Duvall) all fall into the category of routine 
production services. Smith works as a clerk in the Ministry of Truth, where he doctors 
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photographs and newspaper articles, erasing from the public record those people who the 
government wishes forgotten. Lowry is a clerk in the Ministry of Information’s 
Department of Records. THX works on with a team constructing the robotic security 
guards that maintain order in his city. All three attempt to break free of their mundane, 
work-centered lives (Lowry by securing a promotion, Smith by attempting to start a 
revolution, THX by escaping his underground city) upon the introduction of a romantic 
interest that stirs up repressed emotions; neither Smith nor Lowry is ultimately able to 
escape, and THX’s future in the barren desert aboveground is uncertain at best. These are 
three effective, if cynical, illustrations of the lives of routine-production services workers. 
Much less cynical is Gattaca (Niccol, 1997/2008), which presents the possibility 
of routine production services as an opportunity for something even greater. Vincent 
Freeman is born with a congenital heart condition because his mother “put her faith in 
God’s hands rather than those of her local geneticist”. As a result, he is denied any work 
except that of a janitor (in-person services, discussed below). He is so set on achieving 
his lifelong goal of spaceflight that he adopts the identity, including the use of genetic 
material, of someone (Jude Law) who previously worked in routine-production services, 
processing data for the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation. Vincent (now “Jerome”) is 
depicted, genetic “viability” and criminal behavior aside, as the perfect employee, 
making “not one error in a hundred thousand keystrokes”; he also takes time to watch 
every launch that the company sends up, setting him apart from almost all other 
employees. In this way he demonstrates a deep commitment to the mundane, repetitive 
tasks that will lead to the fulfillment of his dream. Gattaca demonstrates the possibility 
37 
that routine production services may also give someone the means to an end greater than 
can be understood by those for whom this work is a foregone conclusion.  
Reich’s second work category, in-person services, “must be provided person-to-
person and thus are not sold worldwide... In-person servers are in direct contact with the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their work; their immediate objects are specific customers rather 
than streams of metal, fabric, or data In-person servers work alone or in small teams. 
Included in this category are retail sales workers, waiters and waitresses, hotel workers, 
janitors, cashiers, hospital attendants and orderlies, nursing-home aides, child-care 
workers, house cleaners, home health-care aides, taxi drivers, secretaries, hairdressers, 
auto mechanics, sellers of residential real estate, flight attendants, physical therapists, and 
– among the fastest-growing of all – security guards” (p. 206).  These are, essentially, 
service economy jobs, and SF depicts them somewhat less often, or at least with less 
significance, than the other two work categories. 
In SF, in-person services seem to be among the likeliest victims of mass 
automation. Often it is merely an environmental detail, the meaning of which characters 
are not obligated to confront. We audience members, however, are free to consider the 
societal implications of THX-1138’s (Lucas & Murch, 1971/2004) robot security guards, 
Total Recall’s (Verhoeven, 1990/1997) automated taxicabs, and The Jetsons’s (Hanna & 
Barbera, 1962/2004) mechanical maid, Rosey. It can also be a matter of comic relief, as 
in the case of Star Trek: Voyager’s (Coto & Straiton, 2004/2006) Emergency Medical 
Hologram (Robert Picardo), whose stiff bedside manner results in many a smirk on the 
part of the crew and audience alike. Tension over the subject may also be present, as in 
the film I, Robot, (Vintar, Goldsman, & Proyas, 2004), where Detective Del Spooner 
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(Will Smith) suspects, and is not proven wrong, that depending on robots for this and 
other kinds of work is not wise. Noon: 22nd Century (Strugatsky & Strugatsky, 
1962/1978) discusses the subject, presented as dialogue between a refugee from an earlier 
time and a native of the 22nd century: 
 [Slavin said,] “You, Yurii, like to talk about optimum use all the time. 
Meanwhile, unimaginably complicated litter robots, gardener robots, moth-and-
caterpillar-eating robots, and ham-and-cheese-sandwich-making robots are 
running all over the place. That’s crazy. It’s even worse than killing flies with a 
sledge hammer, as we said in my day...”  
“Quite the opposite. It’s the liberation of thought, it’s comfort, it’s 
economy. After all, who wants to pick up trash?” (p. 101) 
So, automation of in-person services allows people to work in symbolic-analytic services, 
implying that the latter is preferable. That the word robot is derived from the Czech word 
for forced labor (“Robot”, n.d.) could give us reason to embrace automation: if it can be 
automated, a human is too good for it. Workers in Kurt Vonnegut’s (1952/1999) Player 
Piano would disagree. “Vonnegut's oligarchs are not capitalists but engineers. In the 
future as he envisages it, the machines have completed their triumph, dispossessing not 
only the manual laborers but the white collar workers as well” (Hicks, 1963). The 
resulting rebellion falls apart from within: “followers are busily making gadgets out of 
the scraps of the machines they have been destroying” (ibid). The novel seems to 
conclude that a balance must be sought between reliance on self and a reliance on 
machinery, and that this balance may never be absolutely reached. SF provides a wealth 
of text on the subject of what might be called “automation ethics”, a vital consideration 
within information society studies. I discuss automation below when considering the 
culture of the information society. 
When not automated, in-person services workers can be an effective way to build 
audience sympathy for a character. These characters seem to feel the same bewilderment 
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and exhaustion that we might with the futuristic world around them; nevertheless, they 
succeed at whatever task falls into their laps, just as we like to imagine we would. In The 
Fifth Element’s (Besson & Kamen, 1997), protagonist Korben Dallas (Bruce Willis) is 
just trying to make it through today without wrecking his taxi again, but that doesn’t stop 
him from saving the universe from certain destruction when the need arises. Similarly, 
Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) of the Alien series is an ordinary officer on an ordinary 
mining ship who continually faces the extraordinary nemesis of a vicious and horrifying 
alien life form, not to mention the mental and emotional challenges (staying alive in a 
claustrophobically labyrinthine spaceship [Scott & O’Bannon, 1979/2004], keeping a 
child alive amid a hive of aliens [Cameron, 1986/2004], and gaining the respect and trust 
of an all-male penal colony [Fincher, 1992/2007]) that come with the job.  
Alternately, in-person services workers may be used to embody an optimistic 
spirit about a future in which increasing human knowledge is the driving force for all 
activity. The television show Star Trek is exemplary, featuring a crew whose “five-year 
mission [is] to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to 
boldly go where no man has gone before" (Black & Daniels, 1966/2009). Although their 
work includes elements of research and symbolic problem-solving, both of which fall 
into the third category (below), the crew of the starship Enterprise primarily performs in-
person services. Exploration, making personal contact with other civilization, and “boldly 
going” are all tasks that require bodies to travel as much as data. Although they have 
received training to prepare them for such tasks, these (humans) are largely ordinary 
people who are doing a job that keeps them interested and makes a difference in lives 
across the galaxies.  
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Workers in Reich’s third work category, symbolic-analytic services, “analysts 
solve, identify, and broker problems by manipulating symbols. They simplify reality into 
abstract images that can be rearranged, juggled, experimented with, communicated to 
other specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into reality. The manipulations 
are done with analytic tools, sharpened by experience. The tools may be mathematical 
algorithms, legal arguments, financial gimmicks, scientific principles, psychological 
insights about how to persuade or to amuse, systems of induction or deduction, or any 
other set of techniques for doing conceptual puzzles” (p. 207). 
Symbolic-analytic services workers are a common feature in SF because their 
expertise and skill make for a compelling character trait, especially as computers have 
infiltrated SF storylines. The manipulation of symbols is literally embodied by characters 
in The Matrix (Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999/2007) and its sequels. Here, Thomas 
Anderson (Keanu Reeves) spends his days doing some kind of corporate computer-
oriented work (routine production services) and his nights doing some sort of hacking 
(amateur symbolic-analytic services), where he has named himself Neo. When Morpheus 
(Lawrence Fishburne) opens his eyes to the fact that “reality” is actually an elaborate 
system of virtual reality (the “Matrix”)  used by “the machines” to enslave unwitting 
humans, he is addressed only as Neo (the exception being a security program personified 
as Agent Smith [Hugo Weaving], who insists on calling him “Mister Anderson”). He is 
then taught how to bend the rules of the Matrix, allowing him to run faster, jump farther, 
and so on. Later, Neo becomes “The One”, a prophesied human able to fully manipulate 
the Matrix just as easily as programs do. In this transition, he comes to literally embody 
symbolic-analytic services, expertly manipulating an entire world constructed of symbols 
41 
without using intermediary technology other than his Matrix connection. Although it 
borders on the fantastic, The Matrix illustrates symbolic-analytic services labor in its 
ideal form, where the worker is free to manipulate and interpret symbols without 
hindrance from any “lesser” type of labor.  
Another, less fantastic worker in this category is William Geld (Tim Robbins) in 
the film Code 46 (Boyce & Winterbottom, 2003/2004). William, an insurance fraud 
investigator in Seattle, is assigned to investigate passport (or “papelle”) forgeries in a 
travel insurance processing facility in Shanghai. He performs his investigation through 
simple interviews, during which he uses his exceptional intuitive skills (combined with 
the help of an “empathy virus”) to discover who is lying, in this case, about not forging 
papelles.  Maria Gonzales (Samantha Morton) is the forger, a routine-production services 
worker who smuggles out the faked papelles to earn extra money and, she believes, help 
people achieve desires when the authorities do not allow it. They begin an illegal 
romance, violating the code (number 46) that determines with whom a person may or 
may not enter a physical relationship. When they are found out, the authorities terminate 
her pregnancy and erase her memory. William convinces her of the relationship’s 
existence (though she does not remember it herself), and they flee to Jebel Ali, only to be 
caught again. This time, her new memories are left alone (“They don’t care what you 
think if you’re afuera”, she says), and she is banished to an unnamed desert, from which a 
return to productive city life is nearly impossible. William’s punishment, by contrast, is 
the deletion of his memories of the relationship and damaged intuition; he is allowed to 
return to his comfortable family life otherwise unharmed. Code 46, through its storyline 
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and atmospheric details, delivers a thoughtful picture of the Reich’s categories of work, 
effectively examining economic stratification and its effects on a worker’s humanity. 
Categories of labor not included in Reich’s assessment are agriculture, the 
extraction of raw materials, and construction. Perhaps he considers them to be jobs that 
do not represent the trends that are leading the way to the future (a view that some might 
find classist), or perhaps he believes that they will ultimately be automated and thus do 
not belong in his labor schema. Either way, it seems remiss to leave them out altogether. 
In SF, the automation of agriculture, extraction, and construction all seems to be a 
foregone conclusion, rarely discussed at any length. In some cases, such as the Star Trek 
franchise, technology exists “to dematerialize a quantity of matter, then to rematerialize it 
in another form, often ... to produce food” (Okuda & Okuda, 1999, p.406). Presumably, 
this technology makes agriculture largely obsolete in any practical sense, though it is 
unclear if this is the case for large-scale construction. Mineral extraction technology 
progresses to the point where it can even be done from a spaceship while in orbit 
(“Mining”, n.d.).  
Noon: 22nd Century (Strugatsky & Strugatsky, 1962/1978) is unusual among SF 
works in that it discusses the agricultural system in detail: 
On [Earth] there were about two hundred thousand grain farms growing rye, 
wheat, corn, buckwheat, millet, oats, rice, kaoliang. There were specialized farms 
[...], and broad-based ones. Together they provided the foundation for abundance 
– giant, very highly automated complexes producing foodstuffs: everything from 
pigs and potatoes to oysters and mangoes. No accidental mishap, no catastrophe 
could now threaten the Planet with crop failure and famine. The system for ample 
production, established once and for all, was maintained completely automatically 
and had developed so swiftly that it had been necessary to take special 
precautions against overproduction. Just as there had never been a breathing 
problem, now mankind had no problem eating. (p. 140) 
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It is safe to assume that the same amount of energy has been put toward extraction and 
construction. The result is a society in which literally everyone is a scholar or scientist of 
some kind, even those who, because they are colonizing a new planet, must do manual 
labor until automated facilities are built (p. 94-95).  
 Another exception to the agricultural rule is the case of Soylent Green (Fleischer 
& Greenberg, 1973/2006). Unlike of the technological wonderland portrayed in Noon: 
22nd Century, this film is set in a future United States where pollution has carried on 
unhindered, energy and other resources are scarce, and overpopulation is a fact of daily 
life. Because “real” food is hard to find – it is implied that agriculture as we know it is no 
longer possible – and incredibly expensive, all but the wealthiest citizens of New York 
City depend on the colorful nutritional rations of  the Soylent Corporation, including 
Soylent Green. After learning that the “waste processing plant” where dead bodies are 
now shipped is actually the Soylent Green manufacturing plant, Detective Robert Thorn 
(Charlton Heston) returns to the city to famously announce that “Soylent Green is 
people!” Soylent Green confronts the possibility of a future where technological advances 
do not keep away the threat of environmental disaster and energy shortage. Here, the 
situation is so desperate that it leads some to conclude that cannibalism is the only means 
of survival. 
Another aspect of the economics in information societies is the class structure.  
Norris (2000/2004) dubs this the “social stratification” problem, observing that, “As the 
Internet has become increasingly central to life, work and play – providing job 
opportunities, strengthening community networks, and facilitating educational 
advancement – it becomes even more important if certain groups are systematically 
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excluded, such as poorer neighborhoods, working class households, or peripheral rural 
communities” (pp. 277-278). As with the democratic divide, she explains the range of 
opinions: cyber-pessimists “emphasize deep-seated patterns of social stratification and 
the growth of an unskilled underclass in technological access”, cyber-skeptics “believe 
that technologies adapt to society, not vice versa”, and cyber-optimists “hope that in 
affluent postindustrial societies, at least, the digital divide will eventually succumb to the 
combined forces of technological innovations, markets and the state” (p. 278).  
When it comes to telecommunication, Code 46 (Boyce & Winterbottom, 
2003/2004) falls mostly within the cyber-skeptic camp. Although William’s upper-class 
Seattle home is much more comfortable and luxurious than Maria’s humble apartment in 
Shanghai, both have easy access to high-speed mobile communication devices and are 
able to contact people across the globe with no problem. In other words, having access to 
this technology is clearly not the deciding factor in quality of life. We may safely assume, 
however, that Maria is denied any contact with the developed world once she is banished 
to the desert. On the subject of the semi-bioinformatic papelles, the film is decidedly 
cyber-pessimist. The papelle system has created its own class structure, which Maria is 
fighting by creating forgeries. Maria introduces William to one of her clients, Damien 
(David Fahm), who has dreamed of traveling to India to study bats, but has been denied a 
papelle. Although we learn that this denial was for good reason (he is tragically killed in 
India by a disease for which he lacks immunity), it is still clear that the world is divided 
into those who may cross borders and those who may not. The presence of the deserts, 
from which no one returns and in which no one has mobile telecommunications access, 
adds another level of social stratification that adds to Code 46’s pessimistic tone. 
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Norris (2000/2004) also examines the digital divide as it stratifies the entire world 
of economies as well: a “global divide”, as she calls it. Quoting the United Nations 
Development Programme, she points out the concern that  
[t]he network society is creating parallel communications systems: one for those 
with income, education and – literally – connections, giving plentiful information 
at low cost and high speed; the other for those without connections, blocked by 
high barriers of time, cost and uncertainty and dependent upon outdated 
information. (p.274) 
On the other hand, much has been made in recent years of farmers and small business 
owners across the “developing world” adopting mobile technology and adapting it to 
their needs much more fluidly and efficiently than their counterparts in wealthy nations 
(Garfield, 2008). Again, there is much debate  
among cyber-optimists envisaging the positive role of the Internet for 
transforming poverty in developing societies, cyber-skeptics who believe that new 
technologies alone will make little difference one way or another, and cyber-
pessimists who emphasize that digital technologies will further exacerbate the 
existing North-South divide” (p. 277). 
Many SF works touch on the idea of a global divide, though often couched in 
terms of technology in general. Star Trek has a kind of Warp divide that may be 
analogous to our global digital divide: an order known as the Prime Directive “prohibits 
Starfleet personnel and spacecraft from interfering in the normal development of any 
society... In most cases, the Prime Directive [applies] to any civilization that [has] not yet 
developed the use of warp drive for interstellar travel” (Okuda & Okuda, p. 385). It is all 
but inevitable that, if the Prime Directive is mentioned, the situation is a controversial 
one. In the Star Trek: Enterprise episode “Dear Doctor” (Jacquemetton, Jacquemetton, & 
Contner, 2004/2006), crew members confront a situation that, it is implied, leads to the 
creation of the official policy. Captain Archer (Scott Bakula) and Dr. Phlox (John 
Billingsly) debate the possibility of curing a planet’s epidemic because it would interrupt 
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an evolutionary transition shifting dominancy from one sentient species to another, even 
though they have the capability (thanks to Warp technology) to do so. Captain Archer 
expresses the difficult conclusion: 
Someday my people are going to come up with some sort of a doctrine, something 
that tells us what we can and can't do out here, should and shouldn't do. But until 
somebody tells me that they've drafted that . . . directive I'm going to have to 
remind myself every day that we didn't come out here to play God. 
A contrasting policy is adopted by the Culture, Consider Phelbas’s (Banks 
1987/2008) galactic society of unfathomably intelligent machines and their humanoid 
companions:  
With a sort of apologetic smugness, [the Culture] ... could prove statistically that 
... careful and benign use of ‘the technology of compassion’ (to use a phrase in 
vogue at the time) did work, in the sense that the techniques it had developed to 
influence a civilization’s progress did significantly improve the quality of life of 
its members, without harming that society as a whole by its very contact with a 
more advanced culture. (p. 498) 
Dedication to statistical means-to-an-end rationality, however, also leads the Culture to 
wage military campaigns so dubious that several million people put themselves in stasis 
until “the Culture could statistically ‘prove’ the war had been morally justified”, some 
450 years later (pp. 508, 506). The book’s main character opposes the Culture’s self-
applied right to “play God”: 
Horza could see no end to its [the Culture’s] policy of continual and escalating 
interference. It could easily grow forever, because it was not governed by natural 
limitations. Like a rogue cell, a cancer with no ‘off’ switch in its genetic 
composition, the Culture would go on expanding for as long as it was allowed to. 
(p. 173) 
The conflicting policies of these two spacefaring societies provide many an opportunity 
to consider the political, economic, and social implications of sharing or withholding 
technology of any kind. 
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Works that fall into or borrow from the cyberpunk subgenre often address the 
effects of computerization, not just technology in general, on society. Typically this 
occurs as an environmental detail with larger implications, like Maria’s desert prison in 
Code 46 (no information technology to be found, and no way back to the IT-rich cities 
[Boyce & Winterbottom, 2003/2004]) or the general squalor of the earthbound Sprawl 
contrasted with the hedonistic wealth of orbiting Villa Straylight in Neuromancer 
(Gibson, 1984). One work that addresses the global digital divide head-on is Sleep Dealer 
(Rivera & Riker, 2009), one of a very few works that examine the future of labor from 
the perspective of the “developing” world. Alex Rivera introduces his film by observing 
that, for ordinary residents of the “First World”, telecommunications technology enables  
this sense of being connected around the globe socially. Well, for corporations, 
they’re able to use that connectivity to hunt for cheaper and cheaper workers in 
more distant corners of the planet. Thirty years ago we became accustomed to 
factories moving around the planet and using systems of transportation to send 
goods to American markets. About ten years ago we became accustomed to this 
outsourcing, offshoring thing... That process isn’t over. So what’s next? ... What 
kind of America would that be, if globalization were taken to its logical 
conclusion? (“Reviewing science”, 2009) 
In the film, he answers that question with virtual reality technology that allows people in 
one part of the world to operate machinery in another. The result is that the United States 
can take advantage of undocumented workers doing in-person services but without these 
workers ever actually crossing the border. Sleep Dealer is, unfortunately, in the minority 
among both SF and information science texts in considering change toward a globalized 
society alongside change toward an information society.  
The nature of work is a significant aspect of a society, as is economic 
stratification, whether on a global or a national scale. Critical examination of these and 
other factors will ensure a deep and vital dialogue continues in information society 
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studies, and incorporating the hard, thoughtful questions asked in SF would provide it 
with even more depth and vitality. 
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What are people like as members of an information society’s culture? 
Although it is given far too little academic consideration, culture is an undeniably 
important aspect of human society, including the information society. Langdon Winner 
(1996/2004) has stated that “[t]o invent a new technology requires that (in some way or 
another) society also invents the kinds of people who will use it; older practices, 
relationships, and ways of defining peoples identities fall by the wayside; new practices 
... take root” (p. 40).  This statement identifies one of the most important considerations 
about transitioning into a new kind of society, albeit a too-rarely asked question: What is 
the culture of an information society? Politics and economics, as addressed above, would 
have deep influence over daily life, of course, but there are other dimensions of daily life 
that cannot be addressed in this framework.  Information scientists and theorists have 
invested the greatest part of their energy on examining political, economic, scientific, and 
technological aspects of the information society, but they have considered these socio-
cultural aspects as well, though usually with less depth. Most examinations are overly 
optimistic and unrealistic; the rest tend to fall into critical points-of-view, with what 
seems to be a bit more careful consideration.   
Many theorists share a tendency to draw strong connections the ideals of the 
information society and those of the past in spite of the fact that it represents a “new age” 
in human progress. For example, Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth, and Toffler (1996/2004) 
claim that the information society will “renew the American Dream and enhance the 
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promise of American life” (p. 41), and that “putting advanced computing power in the 
hands of entire populations will alleviate pressure on highways, reduce air pollution, 
allow people to live further away from crowded or dangerous urban areas, and expand 
family time” (p. 37). While the phrase “American Dream” begs for critical analysis 
beyond the scope of this paper, it can safely be said that this version recalls a 1939 
World’s Fair conception of the future, where traditional American values (by one 
definition) are paired with technological innovations that make those values easier to 
uphold. In the World’s Fair vision (specifically Norman Bel Geddes’s “Futurama” 
exhibit, funded by General Motors [Corn & Horrigan, pp. 45-50]), advances in various 
modes of transportation and their respective infrastructures turn cities exclusively into 
business centers, to which professionals commute every morning, and from which they 
return every night to their families in suburbs or nearby towns; for Dyson et al, 
telecommuting accomplishes essentially the same thing, except “virtually”. Masuda’s 
(1990/2004) model reveals a similar optimism, this time in the form of a kind of 
technological back-to-nature movement: “the spirit of industrial society has been the 
Renaissance spirit of human liberation, which ethically means respect for fundamental 
human rights and emphasis on the dignity of the individual, and a spirit of brotherly love 
to rectify inequalities. The spirit of the information society will be the spirit of globalism, 
a symbiosis in which man and nature can live together in harmony, consisting ethically of 
strict self-discipline and social contribution” (p. 20, emphasis in original). In both cases, 
“[t]he future ... becomes nostalgia: a longing for a past of small towns, a simple self-
sustaining life, unencumbered by crass worldly goods” (Corn & Horrigan, 1984, p. 49). 
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On the other side (and, in fact, in direct response to Dyson et al) is Winner’s 
(1996/2004) assertion that “American society will reproduce some of the basic tendencies 
of modernism” in its transition into a postmodern information society, including a focus 
on “individual gratification rather than collective problems and responsibilities” and 
“[t]he presentation of the future society as something nonnegotiable” (p. 51). Winner’s 
critique points out a major gap in Dyson’s vision: if the so-called American Dream could 
not be accomplished in modern, industrial America, why should we believe that it will 
happen in postmodern, “informational” America? The same critique applies to Masuda’s 
model: will “globalism” simply pick up any slack in “human liberation” that the old 
“Renaissance spirit” has left behind, delivering human rights to those who are still denied 
them? To Winner, these are irresponsible proposals, in which oversimplified “solutions” 
ignore the real causes of the problems they ostensibly solve. Winner and those like-
minded warn instead of a hyper-modern future, in which American problems remain 
essentially unchanged (or worsen) because of our relationship to new technologies.  
The Star Trek franchise effectively represents Dyson and Masuda’s point of view 
about a harmonious future brought about by technological advancement. On Earth, as 
discussed above, war is over and people no longer work for the sake of money, changes 
initiated by the incorporation of Warp-level technology into daily life. Ubiquitous 
computing allows anyone to work (or play) anywhere and, if necessary, travel in the blink 
of an eye. Since agriculture is unnecessary, those who farm or garden, like Captain 
Picard’s brother (Jeremy Kemp), do so for personal satisfaction or some other, non-
monetary reason (Moore & Landau, 1990/2007). Even global warming, described by Dr. 
Crusher (Gates McFadden) as “a danger faced by Earth in the 21st century” (Shearer & 
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Manners, 1988/2007), is no longer a risk. In Star Trek, Masuda’s globalism and Dyson’s 
version of the American Dream are both realized in what is depicted as a seamless 
transition. 
The premiere episode of The Jetsons (Hanna & Barbera, 1962/2004) also 
effectively illustrates the view of Dyson et al, but through the lens of Winner’s critique. 
Although George Jetson does commute to work as a “darn good digital index operator” (a 
job that apparently involves push the buttons that start and stop the procedure), the rest of 
the Dyson/Bel Geddes vision is complete – to no avail. Just about everything is 
automated, but no one seems aware that life is easier: Jane complains (in an unfortunate 
dig at “women’s work”) that she hates washing, ironing, and vacuuming while pushing a 
single button to complete each task. In cases where they do see what little work they do, 
we audience members understand that they aren’t gaining anything valuable with their 
technological shortcut: Rosey the robot maid volunteers to analyze daughter Judy’s 
homework tapes in geopolitics, Esperanto, and “space calculus” and give the homework 
answers so that Judy can go swimming in Acapulco that afternoon. Ultimately, what The 
Jetsons suggests is that people are people, no matter what fancy technology you throw at 
them. It is a shallow but valid complaint against the notion that we can depend on 
technological advances alone to make our lives better.  
In his elaborate description of the information society, Masuda claims that, “[i]n 
industrial society, the materialistic values of satisfying physiological and physical needs 
are the universal standards of social values; but in the information society, seeking the 
satisfaction of achieved goals will become the universal standard of values” (p.20, 
emphasis in original).  Dyson et al (1996/2004) agree: “[t]he central event of the 20th 
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century is the overthrow of matter. In technology, economics, and the politics of nations, 
wealth – in the form of physical resources – has been losing value and significance. The 
powers of mind are everywhere ascendant over the brute force of things” (p.30). They go 
on to imply that cyberspace will serve to repair the “personal confusion and social 
disorientation [that] is traceable to conflict within us”, conflict which exists “[b]ecause 
we constitute the final generation of an old civilization and, at the very same time, the 
first generation of a new one” (p. 37, emphasis in original).  Presumably, we are the 
generation, broadly defined, that is coping with the awkward transition of sloughing off 
our worldly desires for a new, cyberspace-inspired intellectual or spiritual enlightenment. 
It is an appealing vision in many ways, but Winner (1996/2004) is skeptical, wondering 
“what kinds of bonds attachments and obligations are in the making” (p. 46) around the 
technologies of cyberspace. He believes, in other words, that materialism will be alive 
and well in the information society, with the difference that it will be centered on 
computers and related devices rather than whatever physical objects we have focused on 
in the past.  
Star Trek again presents a vision that is parallel with Dyson’s and Masuda’s. 
Because of replicator technology discussed earlier, all of Earth is well-nourished and free 
to explore whatever intellectual pursuits they desire, as expressed in Captain Picard’s 
aforementioned statement that “[w]e wish to better ourselves and the rest of humanity” 
(Braga, Moore, & Frakes, 1996/2005). Similarly, Consider Phlebas’s (Banks, 1987/2008) 
reports “in excess of eighteen million people in the Culture, just about every one of them 
well nourished, extensively educated and mentally alert” (p. 91) and “free to take care of 
the things that really mattered in life, such as sports, games, romance, [and] studying 
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dead languages, barbarian societies, and impossible problems” (pp. 90-91) while the 
super-sentient machines provide for their every physical need. Of course, these two 
scenarios assume that these scarcity-eliminating technologies are available for all to use 
freely. In Cory Doctorow’s (2007) “Printcrime”, “printing” refers to the use of matter 
replicators similar to those in Star Trek. The difference is legality: private individuals are 
not allowed to own or operate printers, though it is unclear if, for example, governments 
or manufacturers may do so. After serving a ten-year jail sentence for printing “blenders 
and pharma ... laptops and designer hats”, the narrator’s father has a political awakening. 
“Lanie,” he tells his daughter, “I'm going to print more printers. Lots more printers. One 
for everyone. That's worth going to jail for. That's worth anything.” “Printcrime” reminds 
us that post-scarcity technology can only fulfill its revolutionary mind-freeing potential if 
everyone has access.  
Having one’s every physical need provided for, however, is not a universally-
accepted good in SF. E.M. Forster’s (1909) “The Machine Stops” describes a society in 
which each person lives in his or her own “cell”, never leaving this solitude except in 
extraordinary circumstances. All physical needs are met by the all-powerful Machine, 
and all audiovisual human communication is mediated electronically. Because the 
Machine serves them so loyally, humans have lost all but the slightest physical strength: 
main character is a “swaddled lump of flesh” whose Book of the Machine (a combination 
operating manual and religious text) would be lifted back up by the floor itself if she 
happened to drop it. On a rare trip outside her cell, she observes with horror an occasion 
when someone speaks without electronic mediation and another when an air-ship 
attendant touches someone in an attempt to steady his walk. This society’s aversion to 
55 
first-hand experience extends even to the academic intellectual pursuits that are its 
primary activities. “Let your ideas be second-hand”, says one lecturer, “and if possible 
tenth-hand, for then they will be far removed from that disturbing element - direct 
observation.” The story presents a society that, with all its needs met mechanically, is 
reduced to pushing buttons and speculating on history. The film I, Robot (Vintar, 
Goldsman, & Proyas, 2004) contains a scenario that, if not for Detective Spooner’s 
heroics, could have resulted in the situation described in “The Machine Stops”. In the 
film, all robots are “three laws safe”, having been programmed with the three laws of 
robotics: 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm. 
2. A robot must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law. 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Law.  
Unfortunately, an artificial intelligence with advanced logical abilities concludes that the 
best way to keep humans safe, to keep humanity safe, is to keep them from ever entering 
an unsafe situation to begin with, enacted, significantly, by preventing people from 
leaving their homes. The bridged narrative between I, Robot and “The Machine Stops” 
demonstrates the idea that, even with well-intended logic, orchestrated freedom from 
want may not ultimately serve the best interests of those who are freed.  
To Langdon Winner (1996/2004),“it is evident that, for better or worse, the future 
of human relations – indeed, of human being itself – are now thoroughly intertwined” (p. 
53). Dyson et al (1996/2004) celebrate this intertwining, proclaiming “that cyberspace 
will play an important role knitting together in the diverse communities of tomorrow, 
facilitating the creation of ‘electronic neighborhoods’ bound together not by geography 
56 
but by shared interests” (p. 37). May (2002) cites Bill Thompson as exemplary in holding 
the belief that  
...mutualism, rather than individualism, is (and has been) the way forward in the 
information society... Similarly, Charles Leadbeater suggests that the information 
society will usher in a new period when many social support mechanism will be 
organized electronically and transferred to mutual societies ‘owned’ by their 
members. (p. 98) 
Although few would deny the value of communication on a subject of interest, whether 
dependent upon digital or pre-digital technology, concern could be voiced that 
“traditional” (that is, proximity-oriented) communities and relationships are being eroded 
in favor of “electronic” (that is, proximity-independent) communities and relationships. 
This hard-line view appears inaccurate and possibly out-of-date when one takes into 
account such familiar institutions as the NAACP, which has been concerned with 
building a national (and thus interest-oriented) community as well as strengthening local 
(and thus proximity-oriented) communities since its establishment in 1909 (“NAACP 
history”, 2009), and this just one very recent example in the history of long-distance 
community-building, which surely dates back as far as trade and travel. Nevertheless, 
digital telecommunications technology will doubtless have unique and possibly 
unforeseeable effects on community by any definition that should be examined as they 
occur, or sooner if possible. 
Uglies (Westerfeld, 2005) demonstrates the possibility of simultaneous proximity-
dependent and proximity-independent community. Main character Tally and her friends, 
all teenagers, depend on the city’s communication networks to get in touch and make 
plans for social events, but these social events always occur in person. In fact, parties – 
shallow, but still in-person socializing – are the primary social activities in the city, and, 
even though digital communication can take place all day and night, discussions almost 
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always seems to connect to a party or meeting of some kind. In Snow Crash (Stephenson, 
1992), the immersive, virtual world known as the Metaverse is a social center for untold 
numbers of background characters, but the storyline still involves such “real-world” 
events as house parties and outdoor concerts. Even “The Machine Stops” (Forster, 1909), 
which presents the most extreme case of proximity-independent community, allows some 
in-person communication, albeit a rarely-used option. These works suggest that it is not a 
matter of proximity-dependent or proximity-independent, but a question of which one 
will dominate a person’s life.  
Among those who view the prospect of the information society optimistically, 
there is a strong connection between the computerization of work and an increase of 
leisure time, broadly defined as activities that are subjectively preferable to work. Dyson 
et al (1996/204), again, claim that “putting advanced computing power in the hands of 
entire populations will alleviate pressure on highways, reduce air pollution, allow people 
to live further away from crowded or dangerous urban areas, and expand family time” 
(p.37). Masuda (1990/2004) agrees, saying that “[t]he information society will aim for 
the realization of time-value (value that designs and actualizes future time), for each 
human being. The goal of society will be for everyone to enjoy a worthwhile life in 
pursuit of greater future possibilities” (p. 17, emphasis in original).  He goes on to say 
that “[t]he most advanced stage of the information society will be the high mass 
knowledge creation society, in which computerization will make it possible for each 
person to create knowledge and to go on to self-fulfillment” (p. 20, emphasis in original). 
Opposing this view are those who deny that computerized work is inherently 
better work. For Chrisopher Lasch (1987/2004), we would be wise to be “suspicious of 
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the rosy predictions of a ‘postindustrial’ society in which technological innovation will 
lead to an abundance of skilled jobs, eliminate disagreeable jobs, and make life easy for 
everyone. Everything we know about technological ‘progress’ indicates, on the contrary, 
that it promotes inequality and an unprecedented centralization of political and economic 
power” (p.290). Frank Webster (quoted in Kumar, 1995/2004) points out that “[m]any 
computer workers possess but an aura of skill; their daily work is little more than 
specialized clerical labor” (p. 111). These critics remind us that, like manual labor, 
computer work may be easily “Taylorized” (reduced to as little “brain work” and as few 
steps as possible) and “Fordized” (divided into parts so that no worker can understand the 
whole product), and that, like the factory shop floor, these processes may be deliberately 
incorporated into the design of the technology (e.g. programming languages, operating 
systems, network structures, etc.) so that almost no one can conceive of an alternative 
work structure (Kumar, 1995/2004, pp. 110-111).  
On the question of computerized labor and happiness, Lasch goes even further to 
anticipate and decry full intellectual automation: artificial intelligence. “Now that 
scientists and engineers have devised machines that can allegedly think for themselves, 
contamination becomes a greater menace than ever before, since the condition of this so-
called thinking is precisely that it operate at a level of abstraction where feelings play no 
part. The promise of the computer age, as it appears to its prophets and propagandists, is 
the hope that thought can divorce itself from emotion – the most intractable of the human 
limitation from which technology aspires to deliver us. The utopia of artificial 
intelligence – the final destination of our civilization – rests on the premise that thought 
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can dispense with the thinking self” (p. 294). Hapiness, for Lesch, is nowhere to be found 
when artificial intelligence enters the scene.  
The scenario presented in Sleep Dealer (Rivera & Riker, 2009) provides an 
especially interesting comparison of computerized and non-computerized work because 
characters in the film are using computers for labor that is fully manual in reality. The 
story follows a character named Memo, who, unable to cross the border from Mexico into 
the United States, finds work controlling a robot on a skyscraper somewhere in the U.S. 
construction site through a virtual reality interface in a Juarez “factory”.  
Next to him are ... other machines being controlled by other people. One [person] 
might be in China, one might be in Malaysia, one might be in Brazil, and he’s in 
this workforce where he’s never able to know who his co-workers are... It’s a 
portrait of a totally alienated person. (“Reviewing science”, 2009). 
To make matters worse, he is also paid very poorly compared to what an onsite 
construction worker would make. For Memo, computerization has preemptively 
eliminated any possibility of employee community, much less union organizing, as well 
as all but robbing him of an opportunity for economic upward mobility. 
Sleep Dealer also touches on the role of artificial intelligence in the workplace. 
Luz, an Internet journalist who “instead of using a keyboard and a mouse to input her 
words ... connects her body directly to the network and ... uploads her memories” 
(“Reviewing science”, 2009). When she is composing text, she is often guided by 
suggestions from her computer (“Repeat the last ten seconds. Please tell the truth.”), 
leading one to wonder just who is writing the story. This situation recalls one in Feed 
(Anderson, 2002) when Titus spots girl at a club and tries to figure out what attracts him 
so powerfully. “Maybe it was her spine,” he thinks, “Maybe it wasn’t her face. Her spine 
was, I don’t know the word. Her spine was like ... ?” Uncannily, the feed suggests the 
60 
word “supple”, and Titus accepts it (p. 11). Without understanding it, he further reveals 
the dangers of having even a minor artificial intelligence system directly connected to 
one’s brain:  
That’s one of the great things about the feed – you can be supersmart without ever 
working. Everyone is supersmart now. You can look things up automatic, like 
science and history, like if you want to know which battles of the Civil War 
George Washington fought in and shit. (p. 39) 
These examples effectively illustrate Lasch’s concern that artificial intelligence 
eliminates any practical need for “the thinking self”. 
Is the information society a rebirth of “traditional” values or a continuation of 
neglectful modern policies? Do in-person or electronic communities dominate? Is this 
society inherently materialist or intellectually enlightened? Is life made better or worse 
because of trends in computerizing work and the goal of artificial intelligence? These are 
all issues that have been examined in information science literature and SF works, and 
their incorporation could make these and other cultural considerations even more 
insightful. 
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Conclusion and Future Directions 
The field of information society studies, like science fiction, is inherently future-
oriented. Even if, as some claim, contemporary Americans (or Japanese, or Britons) are 
already living in one, the information society seems to have one foot in the present and 
one foot in the unknown journey through history ahead of us. The societal implications of 
this journey are already wide reaching, whether one takes as its flagship (or coalmine 
canary) trends toward information-oriented labor, changes in the flow of information, 
rapid adoption of new information technology, or some combination of all three.  
Jason P. Vest (2007) has observed that the film adaptations of Philip K. Dick’s SF 
writing, including Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report and Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, 
have “exerted an acute, even overwhelming power over how we imagine the future will 
look, feel, and operate – in short, how the future will be” (p. xiv, emphasis in original). 
This statement can be applied to the best works of the entire genre, regardless of medium. 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. (2008) believes that science fiction “has, more than any other 
contemporary discourse, cultivated the motivating concepts of the global transformation 
of natural existence into a system of interlocking technical systems, the empire of 
technoscience [in which Csicery-Ronay includes information technology]” (p. 161), 
pointing toward its effect on conceptions of the present as well. I have demonstrated in 
this paper that SF has a strong history of addressing topics that are significant to 
information society studies. By taking on these and other works as a body of parallel 
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texts, information scientists and theorists would greatly increase the depth, subtlety, and 
complexity of its scholarship. Much more work needs to be done for this transition to be 
successful, including thorough SF literature reviews on specific elements mentioned in 
this paper and elsewhere, educational cooperation between information science and 
English literature and/or film studies departments, and advocacy in support of the power 
and relevance of works of narrative fiction in a generally “nonfiction” field. These 
developments will give information society studies a renewed ability to concentrate on 
high-quality research and theory, while considering the human implications as science 
fiction has so expertly done throughout its long history. 
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